# DNSSEC – Policy and Practice Statement

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## What is a DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement (DPS)?

- A document that contains the DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement for establishing and managing keys to be used by TLD in conjunction with DNSSEC.
- A DPS may describe how the TLD verifies the link between a domain, a public key and a physical individual or legal entity that is the registrant for a domain, as well as the technical contact for the domain.
- A DPS contains a brief description of the verification procedures, the procedures followed by the TLD and how it handles its keys.
- The document is intended to enable trusting parties to determine the level of trust they wish to grant to the TLD's DNSSEC management.

#### What does the .SE DPS contain (1)?

- .SE's area of responsibility
  - Signing of the .se-zone
  - Secure delegation of underlying zones in the .se zone
- Key administration for the .se zone
  - Technical environment for key generation
  - Procedures for generating keys
  - Storage of keys
  - Use of keys
  - Replacement of keys




#### What does the .SE DPS contain (2)?

- Description of methods for distribution of current public Key Signing Keys (KSK)
  - through a ssl-protected web site.
  - signed with PGP and .SE's official PGP key.
  - KeyID of the PGP key.
  - url for .SE's official PGP key: http://keyserv.nic.se:11371/pks/ lookup?op=get&search=0x97BE17CCC65FA7B0.
  - mailing list address for announcements.



#### What does the .SE DPS contain (3)?

An overall description of key generation and zone signing



## Getting acceptance for the DSP

- Referral to
  - registrars (if you are a TLD)
  - resolving name server operators (ISP's)
  - the local internet community
- They will always come up with aspects you didn't think of...



#### **Public KSK distribution**


Why use a SSL-protected web site?

The public in general does not automatically trust PGP without trusting any other already known signature on the PGP-key. It does not come easy to verify a PGP-signature. In this case it is much easier to trust a SSL certificate.



## Public KSK distribution – other options?

- SE could urge some other organisation(s) to publish the current KSK's of .SE.
- SE will not be able to guarantee the validity of these keys, the user's are responsible of verifying the validity.
- SE may be able to make an agreement with external organisations for publishing .SE:s current KSK. The actual organisations name and link will be published on .SE:s web site and .SE is obliged to supply updates when there is a KSK rollover taking place.
- A precondition to make such an agreement is that the organisation fulfills .SE:s requirement on accurate administration and stability.



Safe for the storage of the keys on smart cards and other equipment required (the safe locked in, in a locker, sited in the server room with very restricted access)





Smart card and smart card reader.






Random Number Generator.




## **Key lifetime**

- This is currently under reconsideration...
- Why should we change DNSSEC key signing keys every other year, when other types of PKI root keys is valid for 20-30 years?
- We need a frequency that prevent us from forgetting how...
- We need a frequency that prevent us from putting a heavy work load to the organization.




Two KSK's always in use, with one year of overlap.














Servers involved... Lockable rack is nice to have.



## Server configuration

- Each DNS operator are strongly recommended to always check the current key - not only to copy and paste without verification.
- They need to be aware that the .SE Key Signing Key (KSK) will be changed from time to time.
- Everyone who configures this key into their resolver are strongly recommended to subscribe to the dnssecannounce@lists.nic.se mailing list where we notify key rollovers and make other important DNSSEC related announcements.



#### We need an AKM

Automatic Key Management for .SE

...supporting DNSSEC-Policy-XML (KASP, Key and Signing Policy)

...and supporting RFC 5011



## Sign the root....

- to realize the greatest benefits from DNSSEC, there needs to be an uninterrupted chain of trust from the zones that choose to deploy DNSSEC back to the root zone.
- The only way to make that happen is to sign the root.



## Signing childs – what is secured delegations?

- The domain must be a sub domain of the parent.
- The domain holder must provide parent with a technical contact person.
- The parent must be able to authenticate the technical contact person for instance by using a certificate signed by a certificate authority trusted by the parent.
- The domain must be delegated to one or more name servers, all of them supporting DNSSEC according to RFC 4033, 4034 and 4035.



#### Verification

- How to carry out the verification of the link between key – Registrant – domain – technical contact?
- What needs to be verified?
- What attributes are needed to verify?
- How far do we want to go?



### Other examples of policies

- http://www.ripe.net/ripe/draft-documents/dnsseckeyproc.html
- http://registro.br/info/dnssec-policy-en.html



## More things needed...

- Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
   Trust Anchors RFC 5011.
- Publish .SE KSK in ISC DLV? Not decided. We rather think of IANA TAR or, even better, a signed root.
- Standardized API for key exchange with .SE.
- Go deeper into key management in DNS.
- More signing tools for NS service providers.

#### Thank you for your attention!

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#### **Exercises! Three different tasks**

- What, in your opinion, is the aim of having a DNSSEC policy and practice statement?
   Discussion. Take notes and prepare a short presentation.
- What, in your opinion, is necessary to put in a policy?
   Discussion. Take notes and prepare a short presentation.
- Critical review of .SE DPS!
   Prepare a presentation with the pros and cons with the .SE way.

