The European DNS Resolver policy sets out the minimum policy and transparency
requirements that should be adhered to by operators of Domain Name System (DNS)
resolver services. It is intended to provide reassurance to end-users and other stakeholders that personal data1 gained in the operation of DNS resolution services are not used for any other purposes except where required by law or regulation, or with GDPR-level consent of the end-user and where it is clearly documented in the operator’s transparency and privacy statement.

Andrew Campling, Director 419 Consulting Ltd

Andrew Campling is Director of 419 Consulting, a public policy and public affairs consultancy focused on the tech and telecom sectors. He has over a decade of non-executive experience backed by nearly forty years of experience in a wide range of increasingly senior roles in a mainly business-to-business technology context. He is currently engaged in several initiatives linked to encrypted DNS and related developments.

The world of DNS is aflame with research into server-side mechanisms to improve privacy of client and recursive queries; yet a simple client-side stub-resolver hack offers adequate performance and security. How?

Alec Muffett, Security evangelist, architect and software engineer

Alec's work has included 17 years for Sun Microsystems, 3 years for Facebook, 8 years for the Open Rights Group, authorship of RFC7686 and a variety of open source software.

This talk will walk you through the why and how of CoreDNS. After this talk you
will come away with how CoreDNS plugins work and how you can write one yourself.
It will also touch upon the good parts and even the less good parts of CoreDNS
and how it compares to the competition.

Miek Gieben,

Miek Gieben is an SRE in the financial industry. During his time in Google he
was responsible for running Google Public DNS. He has co-authored several RFCs
on the topic of DNS(SEC) and started the CoreDNS project several years back.

In his spare time he likes to ride his mountain bike and program a little.
(Neo)VIM is his editor of choice.

Android Flubot is distributed through SMS with links to download the
trojan (also called smishing) and targets more or less all of
Europe. Once a mobile device gets infected it receives SMS tasks from
the command and control server and sends about 5000 to 10000 SMS to new
victims each day.

Flubot spreads like a worm and at the same time makes heavy use of the
DNS. For example:
* it uses a domain generation algorithm (DGA)
* it makes use of DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
* it uses a Fast Flux DNS botnet

This is all to avoid take downs and network blocking. In this talk you
will learn how the trojan works and what the best strategy for
mitigations are.

Daniel Stirnimann, Analyst, SWITCH-CERT

Kindns (kindness) is to DNS what MANRS is to BGP. A way to cooperate and make the internet a safer place.

Adiel Akplogan, ICANN

DNS-Labs has been working on a method for DNSSEC automation for more than a year now. We will show how far we have come and what part of the way is still ahead of us.

Ulrich Wisser, Senior DNS Expert, The Swedish Internet Foundation

Ulrich currently works as DNS Expert at DNS-Labs, the R&D devision of the Swedish Internet Foundation. He is a contributor to IETF, ICANN and other industry events. Since 2017 he serves as a co-chair of the technical working group of Centr.